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Abstract. 
 
This paper examines the effectiveness of budget support aid as an anti-poverty 
instrument. We argue that a major determinant of this effectiveness is the element of 
trust – or ‘social capital’, as it may be seen – which builds up between representatives 
of the donor and recipient. Thus we model the conditionality processes attending 
budget support aid, not purely in the conventional way as a non-cooperative two-
person game, but rather as a non-cooperative game which may mutate into a 
collaborative equilibrium if sufficient trust between the negotiating parties builds up.  
Whether or not this happens is, we argue, fundamental to the effectiveness of 
conditionality, and of budget support aid.  This then requires us to enquire into the 
determinants of trust, which - we empirically demonstrate - derive from the 
experience of the negotiating parties with one another, from the incentives they are 
able to provide to trust one another and from the processes within which their 
negotiations are conducted. The model is tested against two samples: extensively 
against a broad sample of all African countries undergoing budget support operations 
and intensively against a narrow sample of Ethiopia, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia.  
 
The statistical analysis suggests that trust has in practice been achieved not only 
through a positive ‘social history’ but by the transmission of forward-looking ‘signals’ 
or ‘bona fides’ concerning fundamentals: high pro-poor expenditure, low military 
expenditure, and low corruption show a positive relationship with growing trust 
(measured in terms of freedom from programme interruptions). Where these signals 
are present, budget support aid is in general growing, and slippage on overt 
conditionality is in general forgiven; but there are exceptions to this trend, as our case-
study analysis demonstrates . A proactive stance in defence of a pro-poor strategy is 
positive for trust, as are certain procedural reforms including the presence of an IMF 
resident mission and frequent face-to-face meetings between negotiators for donor 
and recipient. High trust generates stability of aid, and stability of aid, in conjunction 
with its level and its targeting, significantly influences growth and poverty outcomes.  
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1.Intuitive foundations 
 
                The literature on budget support aid (programme aid) has, with 
the passage of time, become gradually more pragmatic and even pessimistic. 
Launched with enthusiasm in the glad confident morning of structural 
adjustment in the 1980s, budget support aid has, however, widely been seen 
to fail to deliver on its promises – especially in Africa, the subject of this paper 
– and verdicts such as ‘the failure of [conditional] programme aid’ (Collier, 
1997) have become common. In a context where the reduction of poverty is 
the key objective of aid-giving, such an admission of failure in relation to one 
of the key elements in the aid flow is more than unfortunate. 
                 And yet, there are successes to report. In a number of countries – 
the most commonly cited in Africa have been Uganda, Ethiopia, Ghana 
Mozambique, and with certain reservations Ghana, Tanzania, and  Rwanda  –  
growth with pro-poor qualities has been restored, and the role of budget 
support aid in this process has clearly been substantial. The jury is still out on 
what differentiates these cases from the still distressingly common cases of 
failure, but what is becoming increasingly clear is that one distinctive 
characteristic of the success cases is the formation of trust-relationships 
between the providers and the users of such budget support aid, often linked 
to an emerging consensus on poverty strategy and operating within a loose 
form of conditionality (which we have called ‘new conditionality’; Mosley, 
Hudson and Verschoor 2004) in which slippages on some performance 
criteria are condoned so long as trust concerning fundamentals remains. What 
is at issue, and has not properly been examined by the large literature on 
conditionality and budget support, is how such trust (sometimes characterised 
as ‘social capital’) is formed and sustained in this context, and more 
technically how the modelling of relationships in which trust is a key variable 
needs to diverge from standard models of the ‘game’ between aid donor and 
recipient. The key purpose of our paper is to answer this question, and to 
trace its implications for policy-makers. 
                We can begin from one of the key dilemmas of budget support 
aid, which is that it is often unsuccessful in achieving a sustained 
improvement in economic performance, because the performance criteria 
attached to it are breached, even though it is agreed both by donor and 
recipient that observing them will be in the recipient country’s interest. The 
reasons why this breach occurs are various but one systematic one is the 
threat of disruptive and possibly violent political opposition from interests 
opposed to the reforms on which budget support aid is conditioned. Thus, 
even though the receiving government believes that it will benefit 
economically, in the long run, from the implementation of a particular reform 
condition attached to a budget support loan1 – say an increase in income 
taxation – it fails to implement it, because it fears the political consequences 
of doing so; as a consequence the reform is not implemented, and budget 
support aid looks as if it were unsuccessful. (The case is an actual one, drawn 
from the experience of Bolivia in February 2003. In spite of the withdrawal of 
the politically sensitive income tax increases, further riots followed, and 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper we use the word ‘loan’ to describe budget support operations, which in practice 
may be loans, low-interest credits (e.g. in the case of the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility) or outright grants (in the case of most bilateral donors). 
 3
neither political nor economic stability has yet been restored.) Analytically, the 
problem has analogies with the basic prisoner’s dilemma (Figure 1(a)) in the 
sense that there are elements of both common interest and conflict between 
donor and recipient, and one element of conflict is that both parties derive 
benefit from ‘exploiting’ the other, and breaking an agreement which the other 
player has honoured, as is the case when a donor continues to lend but a 
recipient fails to comply with conditions because he fears the political 
consequences. But as is well known, with the structure of payoffs depicted in 
Figure 1(a), the equilibrium is in the bottom right-hand corner: in practical 
terms, untrusting behaviour on both sides dominates trusting behaviour, and 
the loan process collapses, because the donor implements his threat to not 
disburse the loan. Hence the illustration only describes a rather untypical case 
of budget support lending, in which relations between donor and recipient 
quickly break down and the flow of funds dries up. Although such cases do 
occur, they are not representative of most budget support loans, nor do they 
speak to the case which we wish to examine, in which lending continues but 
at low efficiency because the reforms in policy instruments which are essential 
to make the loan effective have not been implemented. For these, another 
approach is needed. 
 
 
Figure 1. Two illustrations of ‘failed’ programme operations 
(a) The conventional, symmetric prisoner’s dilemma: equilibrium at bottom 
right 
 
                               Player 1 (‘donor’) behaviours 
 Trusting 
(e.g. ‘disburse 
next instalment 
of loan’) 
Untrusting 
(e.g. ‘not 
disburse next 
instalment of 
loan’) 
Trustworthy 
(e.g. ‘ comply 
with conditions’) 
1,1      2,-2 
 
 
Player 
2(‘recipient’) 
responses 
 
Untrustworthy 
(e.g. ‘not 
comply with 
conditions’) 
-2,2 0,0 
Payoffs are given in the order (player 1, player 2). They are defined in terms of  additional 
units of utility in relation to the ‘norm’ in the bottom right-hand corner. 
 
 One possible ‘other approach’,which we have previously taken in 
Mosley, Harrigan and Toye(1995), is to model conditional programme lending 
as a one-sided prisoner’s dilemma (Figure 1b) in which it is acknowledged 
that: (i) the donor derives utility from the continuance of a lending relationship 
– hence the payoff to continuing to lend rather than breaking off lending in the 
bottom left-hand cell is one rather than minus two; (ii) the dilemma is 
asymmetric, because although the recipient gains from being able to exploit 
the donor (in the sense of achieving both finance and non-compliance with 
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conditions) it is not clear what utility any donor would derive from exploiting 
the recipient by refusing to lend to him if he had complied with conditions. 
Accordingly, the top right-hand cell in Figure 1(b) has been amended so that 
the donor derives no utility from exploitative behaviour of this sort. With these 
altered parameters, the dominant strategy equilibrium of the game moves to 
the bottom left-hand corner, in which lending continues even though 
conditions are not complied with. Empirically, this is a commonly observed 
outcome, both with the Bank and with the IMF; however, it is also an 
inefficient outcome, in the sense that  the recipient is failing to manage policy 
instruments in a way which at least the donor considers to be absolutely vital 
for the success of the loan operation, and that failure is being openly indulged, 
with consequent loss of donor credibility. Partly for these reasons, 
conditionality has got itself a bad name, and there have been a number of 
calls for its abandonment, possibly in favour of ‘selectivity’, the approach in 
which countries whose existing management of economic policy is trusted 
receive aid, and others do not. This approach has been espoused particularly 
by the World Bank – the agency which first advocated the systematic 
extension of conditionality in the 1980s – and specifically adapted to the 
context of meeting the Millennium poverty reduction goals by the Bank’s 
former chief economist for Africa, Paul Collier (World Bank 2000, pp. 193-196; 
Collier and Dollar 2001, 2002). 
 
Figure 1. Illustrations of ‘failed’ programme operations 
(b) The ‘one-sided prisoner’s dilemma: equilibrium at bottom left 
 
                               Player 1 (‘donor’) behaviours 
 Trusting (e.g. 
disburse) 
Not  disburse 
Trustworthy 
(e.g. ‘ comply 
with 
conditions’) 
2,2 0, -1 
                      
 
Player 
2(‘recipient’) 
responses 
Untrustworthy 
(e.g. ‘not 
comply with 
conditions’) 
1,3 0,0 
 
 However, there is reason to be sceptical that selectivity will resolve the 
problems represented by Figure 1(b). One of them is moral hazard: once 
‘selected’ to receive long-term budget support, any recipient is contractually 
insured against  punishment for poor performance, and hence disincentivised 
to produce good performance. Worse, there probably are not enough cases of 
good performance by aid recipients, certainly in Africa, to spend even the 
existing aid budget, let alone the expanded aid budgets for the next few years 
that are being urged through programmes such as the International Financial 
Facility (HM Treasury 2004) and the Special Programme for Africa (  see e.g. 
Burdon, in Luthra and Johnston 2005 ) on the basis of unchanged policies; 
thus, if they want to maintain disbursements even at their existing level, 
donors need to work out some incentive for the improvement of policy 
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frameworks, which the selectivity approach does not provide. Moreover, 
conditionality, as previously discussed, has produced some notable success 
cases. The question is how these success cases have materialised, and what 
it is that differentiates these cases from those where conditionality achieved 
no improvement. 
 On this matter, the case studies of Section 3 report three interesting 
findings. The first is that donors2 widely practise new conditionality, in which 
aid flows are sustained if the fundamentals of policy are right, disregarding 
slippage on non-fundamentals. The second is that ‘agreement on 
fundamentals’ is surprisingly difficult to define: it is conventional to describe 
the fundamentals in terms of agreement on poverty reduction strategy 
enshrined in a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and satisfactory 
governance, but there are plenty of cases, Uganda being the one studied in 
section 4 below, where governance is far from ideal on account of substantial 
corruption and yet trust between donor and recipient on fundamentals 
certainly exists. The third is that  the existence or not of such trust between 
high-level negotiators in the donor and recipient institution seems, in fact, to 
be the main determinant of the size and the stability of aid flows. 
 
 Trust, as an indicator of social capital, has of course attracted attention 
as a significant determinant of growth, capable of explaining inter-country 
variations in growth even when conventional causal influences such as policy 
physical and human capital are held constant (Knack and Keefer 1997, 
Whiteley 2000), and a number of enquiries into its dynamics and its correlates 
exist (a good summary is provided by Glaeser et al (2000))3. What is being 
suggested here, in fact, is simply that the social capital which exists between 
just two entities – negotiators for the donor and recipient authorities – is a 
factor of production particularly important for explaining the productivity of 
resources invested in conditionality negotiations. However, as a factor of 
production, trust has a number of peculiarities. In particular, unlike physical 
and human capital, it cannot be bought and sold in a market., and the 
question of  how it can actually be accumulated is germane.  Secondly, trust is 
very hard to measure (Glaeser et al, 2000), and the experimental methods 
which are now widely used by researchers to tackle this problem cannot be 
deployed here.  In this paper we shall finesse the second problem by treating 
interruptions in budget support programmes as a signal that trust-relationships 
between donor and recipient have broken down (and interpret the period of 
breakdown as a measure of the gravity of distrust). We now return to the first 
problem of how trust is accumulated and sustained. 
 
     At the interpersonal level, trust has been modelled, both by 
economists and philosophers (Faulkner, 2004; Barr, 2003; Bacharach and 
Gambetta, 2001) as a game between a truster and a potential trustee, which 
is a good metaphor for the type of social capital we are considering, which is  
precisely trust between two major protagonists in a bargaining process, rather 
                                                 
2 This remark does not include the IMF (which for the most part lends on commercial terms but 
provides some concessional aid finance through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, the PRGF) 
3 Arrow (1972) indicates that ‘virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of 
trust, certainly every transaction conducted over a period of time. It can plausibly be argued that much 
of economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.’ 
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than trust within an entire community. Such trust games are a repeated 
process: on its first play, with no trust between the players, the game begins 
with a structure of raw payoffs like those in Table 1a or Table 1b, and then, if 
the game is repeated a finite number of times, the payoffs to ‘trusting 
behaviour’ are likely to increase as a consequence of the accumulation by 
each player of case-study evidence on the other, to the point where the 
‘trusting’ equilibrium in the top left-hand corner eventually comes to dominate 
the ‘untrusting’ equilibrium in the bottom right- hand or bottom left-hand 
corner, as in the ‘all-in matrix’ of Figure 2 (for a formal demonstration in the 
prisoners’ dilemma case of table 1a see Kreps et al. (1980)) .  
 
Table 2: The all-in matrix: trust made rational 
 
                               Player 1 (‘donor’) behaviours 
 Trusting (e.g. 
disburse) 
Not  disburse 
Trustworthy 
(e.g. ‘ comply 
with 
conditions’) 
3,3 2,-2 
                      
 
Player 
2(‘recipient’) 
responses 
Untrustworthy 
(e.g. ‘not 
comply with 
conditions’) 
-2, 2 0,0 
 
              This process of transition from Tables 1a and 1b  illustrates one of 
the classic processes by which trust is built up: favourable expectations of the 
other party’s future behaviour based on experience of past behaviour.  
Willingness by the recipient to comply with the donor’s conditions, for 
example, may create such expectations on the part of the donor, and stable 
patterns of aid may create them on the part of the recipient. We call trust built 
up by this means, experiential trust (it is sometimes referred to in the 
philosophy literature as ‘affective trust’; Faulkner 2004). However, this is not 
the only means by which trust may be created; there are two other 
possibilities, both of which depend on the intervention of an external agency. 
First, it may be possible for such an agency to protect one or both of the 
players in the game against the possibility of being exploited ; in other words, 
to act as an insurer. In this case external agency has provided an incentive for 
the parties to trust one other to an extent that they did not previously, and so 
we refer to this form of trust as incentivised trust: it is also referred to by 
philosophers as predictive trust. The case studies of Section 4 draw attention 
to various important mechanisms for signalling trustworthiness by which trust 
can be incentivised: these may be seen as heuristics (Kahneman 2003) which 
enable recipients, in a situation where donors have limited information and 
information-processing capacity, to determine who can be trusted and at the 
same time protect themselves against the consequences of  their trust being 
abused. One such ‘signal’ or ‘bona fide’ (as the cases of Uganda and 
Ethiopia, in Section 4 below, eloquently illustrate) is that the fundamentals of  
the development strategy are designed by the recipient, rather than 
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ventriloquised by the donor.  Others include high levels of transparency (low 
corruption), and high levels of pro-poor expenditure (Mosley, Hudson and 
Verschoor 2004) together with low levels of expenditures which are poverty-
unproductive such as military expenditure. Secondly, personality factors may 
also be important in incentivising trust, as can be observed in the case of 
Ethiopia in the 1990s (pages xx-xx below): an inspirational negotiator may be 
able to make himself trusted by his protagonist even though no experiential 
trust has been created by prior  negotiations. Procedural changes, such as 
more frequent contact between donor and recipient, may also be important in 
creating a climate in which trust can be built. However, much as we might 
wish or try to reduce the process of trust-building to a recipe, certain elements 
in that process remain elusive and indeed somewhat instinctive. As Onora 
O’Neill (2002) has emphasised, a proliferation of audit mechanisms has not, in 
industrialised countries, increased public confidence in the suppliers of public 
services, and Mosley and Verschoor (2005), using experimental methods in 
Uganda, have experienced difficulty in incentivising trust by offering insurance 
against trust being abused. 
              Once trust is built up, however, there is no doubt of the payoff, 
specifically within the context of budget support lending. Not only do trusted 
recipients receive larger aid flows, but those flows, precisely because they are 
not being continually being broken off and reinstated, are more stable and 
hence more productive. Just as an unstable external environment is bad for 
investment, so unstable aid is bad for not only the stability but the level of 
domestic development expenditures, which then have an important bearing on 
poverty levels (Mosley and Suleiman 2004;Bulir and Hamann 2003, 2005). By 
contrast, creation of trust leads to stability of flows over time, which has 
benefits for the recipient economy. In the next section we seek to convert 
these considerations – both the determinants of trust and its consequences – 
into a testable model. 
 
 
 
2. The model 
 
In Figure 1 we sketch out the structure of a simple model which reflects  
the considerations sketched out in the first section. Although the centrepiece 
of the structure is a conventional non-cooperative game between a ‘donor’ 
and a ‘recipient’ of conditional programme aid, it is to be emphasised that 
what drives aid effectiveness in this context is the breakdown of the game and 
its replacement by a trust relationship between those parties, as in the main 
metaphor of Section 1 – the transition from Table 1a and 1b to table 2. 
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Evolution of trust 
relationships between 
donor and recipient 
(collapse of game) 
Drivers of trust; 
experiential  
Compliance 
Aid stability 
Aid level and stability 
Drivers of trust: 
incentivised/charismatic 
• Actions (programme 
initiation) 
• Signals (PPE, 
corruption, military 
spending) 
• Procedures 
(frequent informal 
contact, etc) 
 
Conventional non-
cooperative 
‘conditionality game’ 
between donor and 
recipient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth rates 
Poverty levels 
Other policies and 
determinants of 
development incl. 
inequality,physical and 
human capital investment 
Expenditure stability 
and effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model structure 
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I.The standard conditionality game, without trust 
 
 We may begin by considering the objectives of lender and recipient. 
The recipient government has a financial motive to maximise the inflow of 
finance and a political motive (as illustrated by Tables 1a and 1b) to resist at 
least some elements of conditionality. The recipient’s utility function is 
therefore 
 
Uj = f(t,p,X); ft<0, fp<0, fx>0                                                                 (1) 
 
Without loss of generality we can write this as a linear function: 
 
Uj = X – βt                                                                                        (1a) 
 
where the notation is as set out in Table 3. The utility function is negative in 
number of conditions (t) and the proportion of them that is implemented (p) 
because if any policy conditions are necessary, it can be assumed that a 
recipient exempt from any pressure has no wish to implement any of them4. 
The utility function is presumed positive in X (the value of finance provided) 
because of an expectation that such finance will reduce the cost to him of 
achieving his developmental and other objectives; in the limit, if such finance 
cannot be secured from any other source, the country simply runs out of 
reserves. 
 
Table 3. Notation 
 
Symbol Meaning Empirical specification 
U Utility  
X Volume of lending(aid)  
OFF Volume of other (non-
aid) financial flows 
 
t Number  of conditions 
attached to a budget-
support loan 
 
p 
 
 
Hence 
 
1-p 
Proportion of conditions 
implemented 
 
 
 
Proportion of conditions 
not implemented 
(‘slippage’) 
Implementation rate on 
World Bank adjustment 
loans and IMF ESAFs 
between  
                                                 
4 This does not imply that there are no gainers from conditionality. Rather, such gainers (eg people 
working exporting industries) are typically scattered, unorganised, and receive their gains in the long 
rather than the short term, so that the government has little political interest intrying to satisfy them. 
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q Recipient’s ability to 
repay debt (debt-service 
ratio) 
 
S Trust (social capital) 
between donor and 
recipient 
Frequency of 
interruption of lending, 
controlling for slippage 
(1-p) 
A Vector of factors which 
determine affective 
(incentivised) trust: 
1.‘Bona fides’: 
PPE 
Military expenditure 
Corruption 
2.Initiator dummy 
1. Procedural 
variables 
(frequency of 
contact etc.) 
P Vector of factors which 
determine 
predictive(experiential) 
trust: 
Compliance with 
conditions 
 
Aid instability 
Pov poverty indicator Headcount 
 
Under 5 mortality 
I Inequality indicator Gini coefficient 
 
The utility of the lender is expected to vary positively with volume of 
lending: in particular because economic performance in the recipient country 
is conceived by the donor as varying positively with amount of lending 
achieved,  and because the reputations and control over resources of donor 
staff working in operational departments increase as the volume of business 
done by their department grows (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 1995, Chapter 
3). But a sustained growth of lending, of course, requires that clients remain 
able to repay loans, and this requirement acts as a constraint on the 
implementation of conditionality, since  the interruption of a loan because of 
non-implementation of  conditions may prejudice the ability to repay loans to 
the lender and all other creditors. In consequence of this conflict between 
lending and leverage, which we refer to as the creditor’s dilemma, the lender’s 
utility function will be influenced not only by amount of landing and conditions 
implemented, but also by the recipient’s ability to repay debt (q) 
 
Ui = g(tp, q, X); gt >0, gx>0, gp>0, gg>0           (2) 
 
which by analogy with (1) can be linearised as  
 
Ui  = X + αtp                                                                (2a) 
 
Using these utility functions, the ‘tree’ of the game between donor and 
recipient can be drawn as a three-act game, as in Figure 2. The matrix of 
payoffs in Act 3 corresponds exactly to the ‘asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma’ of  
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Figure 1b5, and it can be readily shown (see Appendix) that in the equilibrium 
solution of this game, the volume of lending depends on tightness t, 
implementation p (the negative of slippage), and the parameter of the 
recipient’s utility function β. In a linearised version, the reduced form of the 
game’s solution may be written as: 
 
      X = constant + a1 t + a2p + a3β                            (3) 
 
                                                 
5 With α =β= p = (0.5), X = t = (2), the game payoffs are as specified in Figure 1b above. 
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Figure 2. The ‘game’ between donors and recipients of conditional aid 
 
Act 1  Lender Loan: tightness t  
 
 
Act 2  Recipient  Slippage p 
 
 
 
 
 
Act 3 Lender: evaluates recipient’s 
slippage as satisfactory? 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 No  
 
Lender: higher utility from repeat 
loan than no repeat loan? 
(X2 + αpt) –L ∂q
 (1+r)              ∂(1-γ) 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lender 
 
 
relends: 
        
 
Lender                         No repeat loan: 
Lender payoff 
(Act 2) 
 
(Act 3) 
 
 
X + αpt  
 
X2 + αpt) –L ∂q
 (1+r)           ∂(1-γ) 
 
 Lender payoff  
(Act 2) 
 
(Act 3) 
 
X + αpt  
    
L ∂q             
    ∂(1-γ) 
Recipient payoff 
(Act 2) 
 
(Act 3) 
 
X - βpt 
 
X - βpt 
1 + r 
 
 Recipient payoff 
(Act 2) 
 
(Act 3) 
 
X - βpt 
 
0 
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II. The determinants of trust 
 The conditionality game described above is played as a non-
cooperative game, unclouded by any concerns of reciprocity, friendship or 
trust. However, such trust, as we have discussed, may indeed be present 
between the participants in conditionality negotiations, and in the transition 
from Figures 1a and 1b to Figure 2 above it was fundamental to causing the 
game to break down, and thence to the volume, the stability and thence the 
effectiveness of the concessional resources transferred. Analytically, what we 
visualise is that the parameters α and  β (donor and recipient utility) will in 
practice  vary not only with the factors described above, but also with the trust 
which each negotiating party has in the other. This immediately raises the 
question of how trust is measured, determined and created, all of which 
questions have proved contentious within the social capital literature: Glaeser 
(2002:437), for example, report that ‘there does not yet exist a commonly 
accepted theoretical framework for thinking about the determinants of 
investment in social capital’. Our response is, at the level of measurement, to 
represent the level of trust between donor and recipient in terms of the 
stability or frequency of interruption  of the relationship. At the level of 
prediction, as previously discussed, we partition trust (or social capital, S) into 
predictive and affective elements: 
 
β = f (S). S= a5 + a6P + a7 A                                                         (4) 
 
where P and A are vectors of ‘experience’ variables which respectively 
explain experiential trust (explicable in terms of past experience of the other 
party) and predictive/incentivised  trust (explicable by other factors, including 
interpersonal affect, and opportunities for insurance and verification) 
respectively. Once we investigate by case-study methods the processes by 
which trust appears to be effectively built up in international negotiations 
(section 4) we encounter some surprises. For example, a good track-record in 
complying with conditions (low slippage (1-p), in the notation of equations (1) 
and (2)) does not necessarily build up trust, nor does a poor record of 
compliance with conditions destroy trust. Uganda in the late 1980s and early 
90s persisted with fixed exchange rates and with export taxes on coffee, both 
of which were anathema to the Bank, and Ethiopia, in addition to fixed 
exchange rates, kept land and agricultural credit within the public sector 
against the Bank’s advice. What mattered was that the governments of those 
countries, at a time when the donor community was moving over towards the 
poverty targets of the Millennium Development Goals as primary beacons for 
development policy, not only adopted but initiated poverty reduction strategies 
of their own. This generated predictive trust: in additional cases, other factors 
were also crucial, including personal warmth between the negotiators for the 
donor and the recipient. The blending of the two types of trust – in the case of 
the World Bank and Ethiopia - is nicely illustrated by Joseph Stiglitz’s account 
of his meetings with President Meles Zenawi in the middle 1990s, which 
helped to achieve one of the transformations of confrontational game into trust 
equilibrium which we have been discussing: 
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‘A doctor by training,  Meles had formally studied economics because he knew that to bring 
his country out of centuries of poverty would require nothing less than economic 
transformation, and he demonstrated a knowledge of economics – and indeed a creativity – 
that would have put him at the head of any of my university classes. He showed a deeper 
understanding of economic principles – and certainly a greater knowledge of the 
circumstances in his country – than many of the international economic bureaucrats that I had 
to deal with in the succeeding three years. Meles combined these attributes with personal 
integrity: no-one doubted his honesty and there were few accusations of corruption within his 
government….His political opponents raised questions about his commitment to democratic 
principles, but he was not an old-fashioned autocrat. Both he and the government were 
generally committed to a process of decentralisation, bringing government closer to the 
people…[and] the World Bank had direct evidence of the competence of the government and 
its commitment to the poor. Ethiopia had formulated a rural development strategy, focussing 
its attention on the poor, and especially the 85 per cent of the population living in the rural 
sector. It had dramatically cut back on military expenditure…because it know that funds spent 
on weapons were funds that could not be spent on fighting poverty. Surely, this was precisely 
the kind of government to which the international community should have been giving 
assistance6’. (Stiglitz 2003, pp 26-28; emphasis added) 
 
 
In the empirical work of Sections 3 and 4 we also discover that procedural 
factors (such as the frequency of meetings between donor and recipient, and 
whether the donor had an office in the recipient country), as well as policy and 
experiential factors, help to determine the build-up or otherwise of affective 
trust between donors and recipients of conditional programme assistance. 
 
III. Conditionality and Aid flows 
 
We expect that where trust is low and programme aid flows are often 
interrupted, the effectiveness (rate of return) on those aid flows, in terms of 
their growth impact, will be less: 
 
 
G = a8 + a9 X + a10σx(P, A) + a11S + standard new growth-theory variables                                  
(5) 
 
Note the role of aid instability σx, driven by predictive and affective trust 
between the aid donor and recipient P and A.  
 
iv. Determinants of poverty 
 
Finally, poverty (equation (6)) is driven by growth and other factors which 
influence the level of the growth elasticity in particular countries. Some of the 
factors which influence the poverty elasticity will be policy variables – 
including the ones which influence affective and predictive trust, such as pro-
poor expenditure. Other proven ‘confounders’ of the growth-poverty 
relationship include inequality (Hanmer and Naschold 2000),  and corruption 
(Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor, 2004) . We have included these 
confounders in the specification of equation (6). 
 
                                                 
6 It was, in part due to Stiglitz’s advocacy. The phrase ‘should have been’ relates to the IMF’s initial 
reluctance to come on board because fiscal conditions had not been met.  
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Pov = a12  + a13G + a14I                                                                (6) 
 
 
These six relationships (the last specified with two different definitions of 
poverty, the headcount and infant mortality), plus an equation to endogenise 
the Gini coefficient of inequality in (6) make up the model estimated in the 
next section. 
 
 
3. Tests: econometric 
            As there are simultaneities in the system, portrayed in Figure 1, we 
estimate the model consisting of (3) (4) (5) and (6) by three-stage least 
squares (table 4), with allowance made for country and time fixed effects.  The 
estimation is made for the period 1985-2004 in relation to a group of fourteen 
countries in Africa which received budget support aid under the guidance of 
both the Bank and the IMF: the ESAF(Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility) countries, now known as PRGF (Poverty Reduction and Growth) 
countries.  A word must be said about two of the variables before the results 
are presented. Budget support aid, here, is simply concessional support 
provided by the IMF (through SAF/ESAF/ PRGF/HIPC) and the World Bank 
(through structural adjustment operations, sectoral adjustment operations, and 
other policy-based operations such as reconstruction loans). No programme 
assistance from regional development banks or bilateral donors is included, 
although this is generally provided in support of operations by the Washington 
institutions and so can be expected to correlate strongly with their 
disbursements. Secondly, compliance with conditionality , measured as the 
proportion of conditions that is implemented, needs to be understood as an 
attempt to hit a moving target. Whereas the performance criteria (policy 
conditions) imposed by the IMF have gently evolved over the twenty years of 
our survey in the ‘more micro’ direction of greater usage of tax increases and 
public enterprise reform, those imposed by the Bank have evolved very 
radically from market liberalisation into the much broader territory of, in 
particular, governance and poverty reduction. In the process the Bank’s 
yardstick for the assessment of policy has evolved into the multi-faceted CPIA 
(Country performance and Institutional Assessment) index, and it is this 
yardstick which has been used for compliance assessments made after 
20007. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The CPIA index contains twenty indicators. For details of its construction see the Appendix. 
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Table 4. Results of SE regression analysis: poverty, growth, and aid 
characteristics 
Estimation method. 3SLS. Dataset consists of panel data running from 1986 
to 2004. 
 Dependent variable 
 (1)Trust 
variable 
(2) 
Compliance 
(3)Budget 
support 
aid 
(4) 
Aid 
instability 
(5) 
Log 
GDP/capita 
(6)Gini 
coefficient 
of 
inequality 
(7)Poverty 
headcount 
(8)Infant 
mortality 
Constant 8.09 
(0.95) 
-20.9 
(6.26) 
85.5** 
(4.65) 
13.19 
(1.23) 
-34.5** 
(6.57) 
-43.5** 
(3.56) 
-18.20** 
(3.40) 
6.97** 
(2.61) 
Trust variables 
Distrust 
parameter 
(programme 
interruptions) 
  -0.97** 
(9.93) 
0.098** 
(2.85) 
-0.22** 
(7.78) 
 0.011 
(0.39) 
-0.039** 
(2.62) 
‘Bona fides’:         
Compliance with 
conditionality 
-0.19** 
(2.52) 
 1.71** 
(6.64) 
 0.42** 
(5.81) 
-1.60** 
(9.69) 
-0.41** 
(5.49) 
-0.19** 
(5.10) 
Ln (PPE) -0.52** 
(12.22) 
0.118** 
(5.82) 
-0.30** 
(4.99) 
-0.30** 
(4.99) 
0.24** 
(8.00) 
-0.20** 
(2.65) 
-0.10** 
(3.04) 
-0.008 
(0.49) 
Ln (military 
expenditure) 
 -0.073* 
(2.33) 
0.58** 
(6.94) 
0.58** 
(6.94) 
-0.38** 
(8.80) 
1.41** 
(13.49) 
0.20** 
(3.78) 
0.077** 
(2.83) 
Corruption -0.24 
(2.23) 
0.65** 
(14.06) 
-1.21** 
(9.77) 
-1.21** 
(9.77) 
0.59** 
(7.56) 
-1.19** 
(6.55) 
0.15* 
(1.89) 
0.10 
(1.52) 
Financial flows         
Aid  0.015 
(1.72) 
  0.038** 
(2.81) 
-0.27** 
(8.58) 
-0.13** 
(9.40) 
-0.01 
(1.50) 
Aid instability  -0.062** 
(3.45) 
  -0.17** 
(6.89) 
-0.49** 
(8.47) 
0.24** 
(8.71) 
-0.005 
(0.39) 
GDP per capita      -0.13 
(1.19) 
-0.53** 
(10.78) 
-0.275** 
(11.04) 
Process 
variables: 
        
Recipient-
initiator dummy 
-1.89** 
(14.08) 
0.48** 
(7.26) 
      
Residence 
dummy 
0.13 
(1.74) 
0.20** 
(6.54) 
      
Need indicators         
Ln (infant 
mortality) 
        
Debt service         
Total population         
GDP/capita  0.25** 
(7.37)      
-0.275** 
(11.04) 
Other indicators:         
Openness 
dummy 
 0.093** 
(4.75) 
0.42 
(4.14) 
-0.44** 
(8.18) 
0.21** 
(7.75) 
-0.16 
(2.55) 
0.19 
(6.62) 
-0.035* 
(2.44) 
         
Log (Gini 
coefficient of 
inequality) 
   0.23**   0.17** 
(8.10) 
0.058** 
(5.32) 
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Time fixed 
effects 
-0.0051 
(1.20) 
0.011** 
(6.90) 
-0.045 
(4.99) 
-0.004 
(0.87) 
0.02** 
(7.90) 
0.021** 
(3.47) 
0.012** 
(4.70) 
-0.0003 
(0.27) 
Country fixed 
effects 
0.058** 
(6.88) 
0.004 
(1.40) 
0.043* 
(2.03) 
0.054** 
(4.80) 
-0.007 
(1.43) 
0.026* 
(2.11) 
0.071** 
(13.26) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
No. 
observations 
215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
(Pseudo)R2 0.7888 0.6038 0.4923 0.6084 0.3576 0.7967 0.6989 0.7272 
P 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Estimation method. 3SLS 
Variable definitions ( source is  World Bank World Development Indicators CD-ROM unless 
stated):  
Budget support aid: gross annual disbursements, from World Bank and IMF Annual Reports  
and project performance audit reports (database In Appendix) 
Aid instability: coefficient of variation of disbursements, from World Bank and IMF Annual 
Reports  and project performance audit reports (database In Appendix) 
Compliance with conditionality: percentage of conditions implemented. From miscellaneous 
sources (see Appendix) 
 Residence dummy: 1 if IMF maintains a resident mission in country stated, 0 otherwise. From 
Mecagni(1999), table 
Recipient-initiator dummy: 1 if the recipient government initiates significant components of the 
government’s poverty reduction strategy paper, 0 otherwise. 
Openness index: the Sachs-Warner indicator. 
PPE: ‘pro-poor expenditure’, consisting of the share of primary health and education, rural 
water and sanitation, agricultural research and extension, and social protection, less military 
expenditure, in total government spending. For full details of the construction of the index see 
Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004), appendix 1. 
 
 
 
The main inferences from Table 4 are the following. 
First, trust, in the sense of the frequency of programme interruptions, is 
heavily influenced by  recipient charisma and initiative (the initiator dummy); 
several ‘signals of good intent’, including pro-poor expenditure, and low levels 
of corruption8.  Trust is more robustly associated with these ‘bona fides’ than it 
is with compliance with conditionality, which is only just a significant influence 
(at the 5% level).  
 
Second, the results in the third and fourth equations strongly support our 
hypothesis that trust and not just compliance matter for the level and  stability 
of aid disbursements. In the aid flow equation (3) the (dis)trust variable 
impacts with greater significance than the compliance variable. 
 
Third, not only the level but the stability of aid flows strongly influence welfare 
outcomes, and in particular growth and poverty. In these regressions, aid is a 
strongly negative influence on both inequality and headcount poverty, 
controlling for the level of ‘bona fides’, openness and country and time fixed 
effects. 
 
                                                 
8 Corruption is significant only at the 5% and not at the 1% level. The impact of corruption on this 
form of aid does, however, have the ‘right’ sign, somewhat at variance with the findings of Brauetigam 
and Knack (2004 ), who find a positive association between corruption and the level of aid.  
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Putting these findings together, it can be said with some confidence that the 
achievement of higher levels of mutual trust between aid donors and 
recipients would be good for aid effectiveness and poverty reduction: but this 
begs the question of  how this can be achieved, and how, in what are still 
scarce cases, it has achieved in practical terms. The next section considers 
these issues in relation to a small sub-set of our main sample.
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4. Evidence from country case-studies 
              In this section we elaborate on our econometric work by 
presenting evidence of a more qualitative and anecdotal kind.  In table 5, 
we present evidence of this type not for all of the thirty-nine countries in 
Section 3 but only for six – three (Ethiopia, Uganda, Ghana) whose 
relationships with donors became, over the period, more trusting and 
stable and three (Malawi, Kenya, Zambia) for whom they were less so.  
The discriminators presented as explanations of performance in the left-
hand column are the same as those used in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 5. Case-study countries: experience of budget support operations, 
determinants of trust and aid-effectiveness  
(data period: 1980-2003) 
 High trust, low volatility Low trust, high volatility 
 Uganda Ghan
a 
Ethiopia Malawi Zambia Kenya 
Aid indicators:       
Aid/GDP% 9.2 5.6 12.1 16.6 11.6 6.5 
Aid volatility 
parameter (sd) 
                (c  of v) 
 
6.49 
69.5 
 
4.1 
73.2 
 
5.44 
44.6 
 
8.90 
53.6 
 
12.90 
111.2 
 
3.55 
53.8 
Indicators of 
relationship with 
aid donors and 
of performance: 
      
CPIA(2002) Very good Good Good Moderate Modera
te 
Poor 
Conditionality on 
adjustment 
lending: 
Agricultural policy 
Privatisation 
Governance 
Public 
expenditure 
prioritisation 
 
PRSP 
Overall score for 
slippage on 
conditionality  
(1-p) 
 
 
 
** 
** 
** 
 
 
*** 
 
yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
*** 
* 
*** 
 
 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
** 
* 
** 
 
 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
** 
** 
* 
 
 
 
 
yes 
 
 
 
** 
* 
* 
 
 
 
 
yes 
Trust score% 
(number of 
programme 
interruptions; high 
level denotes low 
trust) 
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Expenditure 
stability (pro-poor 
sectors)% 
26.7  26.9  (44.3)  
Outcome 
indicators: 
      
Poverty reduction 
1990-2000(or 
nearest available 
period) 
Decline 
from 
56%(1992) 
to 
35%(2000)
, possible 
increase 
thereafter 
Minor 
declin
e 
Decline 
from  51 to 
44%?1992
-2000 
Increase 
from 54% 
(1990) to 
65% 
(1998) 
Increas
e 
68%(19
91) to 
72% 
(1996)  
Increase 
46% 
(1992) 
to 50% 
(1998) 
Annual average 
GDP growth 
1990-2000 (or 
nearest available 
period) 
7.2 4.3 4.8 4.0 1.0 2.2 
Sources: Aid data from OECD Development Assistance Committee database. 
Trust score is a measure of interruptions on IMF and World Bank budget support lending, see 
notes to Table 4 above. CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) score from 
Collier (2001), table 3, p1796. All other data from World Bank, World Development Indicators 
2003, CD-ROM. 
 
 At first sight it might seem from table 5 as though the principal 
difference between the three cases of pro-poor growth on the left-hand side of 
the table and the three cases of lower growth, and increasing poverty, on the 
right-hand side of the table consisted of worse policies, reflected in lower 
compliance with conditionality, which then led to lower and more unstable aid 
flows. And indeed, there is quite a significant correlation,  between low 
implementation of conditionality and high volatility of programme aid (Figure  
3, mislabelled as ‘Figure 7’ in this version  ). This appears, on the surface, to 
support the recommendation of the IMF staff members Bulir and Hamann 
(2003, 2005) that ‘a higher degree of compliance with conditions attached to 
aid is likely to lead to a smoother path of [aid] disbursements’ (2003, p.82) – 
and thence, by implication, to a more effective and pro-poor pattern of growth.  
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         However, this recommendation is superficial, as it conceals the 
dynamics by which rapid and stable growth of aid flows has been achieved in 
some countries and not in others with very similar initial conditions.  In  Figure 
4 (mislabelled as ‘Figure 8’ in original) we contrast four of these countries, 
whose compliance with loan conditionality in the middle 1990s was very 
similar, at about 50-60%, but whose economic performance, and relationships 
with aid donors, evolved in highly contrasted fashion. The first two appear in 
the ‘poverty reduction’ group in Table 5,  Uganda, where compliance 
increased over time but aid volatility was always moderate and  Ethiopia, 
where compliance increased over time but aid volatility diminished 
dramatically;. The next two appear in the ‘increasing poverty’ group: Zambia, 
where compliance was moderate and aid volatility high throughout; and  (iv) 
Malawi, where compliance improved and yet volatility after a bad start became 
worse. Why these differences? 
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We hypothesise that the key variable in determining the trajectory and 
effectiveness of aid flows, and specifically budget support aid,  was the 
emergence or not of trust-relationships between representatives of the aid 
donor and recipient. We have further argued in the econometric analysis of 
Section 3 above (see Mosley and Suleiman, 2005) that certain key factors can 
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be identified which caused these trust-relationships to develop and to 
disintegrate: 
(i) willingness(or lack of it) to target public expenditure in a pro-poor direction; 
(ii) levels of corruption in the public service; 
(iii)willingness (or lack of it) on the part of the recipient to take initiatives in 
policy formulation, rather than strike a passive attitude in relation to the donor.  
(iv) the personal charisma of, and chemistry between, negotiators on behalf of 
the donor and recipient. 
The operation of these four causal factors can be illustrated in relation 
to the developments in the four case-study countries depicted on Figure 4. All 
began in the early 1990s, as mentioned, with compliance rates in the 50% - 
60% range. Uganda was still adhering, in defiance of the advice of the Bank 
and Fund, to export taxation in coffee and to elements of a fixed exchange 
rate, whereas Ethiopia had equally defiantly retained state control over land 
and rural microfinance. In the pivotal year of 1994,however, both countries 
took key initatives, not paralled by other recipients, in the field of public 
expenditure programming.  Uganda articulated public expenditure priorities in 
favour of sectors designated as pro-poor (primary education and health, 
agricultural research and extension, rural water and infrastructure) and 
Ethiopia initiated a more radical reform of public spending9, more than halving 
the military budget in favour of education, agriculture (with an emphasis on 
vulnerable environments and drought mitigation) and infrastructure. These 
‘signals’ of good intention (portrayed on Figure 4) won the trust of the donors 
even though formal compliance on the budget support programme at the time 
was, as we have seen, not high, and this trust was able to sustain itself in 
spite of (prima facie) grave breaches of performance criteria, such as the 
Ethiopian government’s return to war with Eritrea, and consequent military 
overspend, in 2000. Trust was won and sustained through two channels, 
firstly by identifying a coherent strategy towards pro-poor growth (with, in both 
cases, a strongly pro-agriculture flavour, somewhat against the prevailing 
current of poverty advice within international financial institutions) and 
secondly by doing so proactively: the factor which we have attempted to 
capture in the ‘initiator dummy’ of table 2. It has been reinforced by results, 
notably the evidence of a long-term decline in poverty in each of these 
countries over the course of the nineties.  In the process a level of trust has 
been reached in some countries, certainly in Uganda, where in the case of the 
World Bank recipient and donor jointly determine performance criteria rather 
than their being imposed by the donor (Adam and Gunning, 2002); this of 
course gives a recipient once in a virtuous spiral still more room for 
manoeuvre10. By contrast, both in Malawi and in Zambia the obligatory 
poverty reduction strategy was prepared as a response to a donor demand, 
so that the recipients lost the initiative and encouraged the donors to focus on 
other skeletons in the cupboard, such as corruption and other problems of 
governance. In the process aid flows, lost momentum and became volatile, 
with stoppages in the overall flow in Malawi in 1995 and in Zambia in 1998, 
                                                 
9 This was accompanied by a training programme in the form of an MBA in public sector management, 
commissioned by the Ethiopian government from the Open University between 1995-99 and 
compulsorily taken by all senior managers in the government from the president downwards. 
10 The Fund, however, does not yet take this approach that conditions are negotiable. 
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and with mutual trust having been eroded, even genuine pro-poor initiatives 
by government, such as the Malawi Government’s Starter Pack programme 
for small farmers in 199911, did not yield a dividend in terms of either the 
magnitude or the stability of aid flows, with donors being divided about the 
proper manner in which to respond (Harrigan, 2003) . This discord between 
the donors then applied a multiplier to the existing distrust (the variable 
analysed in this paper) between donor and recipient. 
 
               Various lessons emerge from these case studies. One is that the 
social capital between donor and recipient is influenced not only by the 
behaviour of individual donors and recipients, but also by the coherence or 
otherwise between the behaviours of the donors. In all of the countries 
examined but especially Malawi, the discord between the donors left the 
recipient unable to satisfy all of them by any set of policy actions. Malawi, 
classically, - and to a lesser extent Zambia and Kenya also - was a country 
where the donors could not agree, and because they did not agree, the 
relationship between donor and recipient, and the stability and effectiveness 
of the aid flow to the recipient country, suffered badly. A second is that there is 
no direct mapping from any of the ‘bona fides’ which we have identified to 
mutual trust – perceptual factors matter, and genuine pro-poor initiatives may 
fail to break the cycle of low trust, aid instability and low support expenditure, 
as in Malawi even where genuinely pro-poor initiatives exist, if they are not 
given the right packaging.  A third is that where aid was severely unstable – 
Malawi and Zambia  - the place where the impact was felt was directly on the 
effectiveness of public expenditures and on the level of net inward investment: 
which is fragile everywhere in Africa but particularly in those environments 
                                                 
11 In many ways the Malawi government was the victim of poor presentation rather than poor policy. It 
had previously fought through the 1980s to retain against World Bank opposition, then in 1994  
abandoned, a fertiliser subsidy and a smallholder rural credit administration which were both intended 
to overcome capital-market constraints in favour of low-income farmers. But it had no spokesperson to 
show how these initiatives could be represented as part of a poverty strategy, let alone a high-level one 
such as Tumusime-Mutabile in Uganda or Meles in Ethiopia; rather, the battle was fought purely on 
grounds of fiscal feasibility. Thus, when the even more pro-poor Starter Pack initiative was mooted in 
1998, the Malawian government had no basis of pro-poor credibility with which to build in relation to 
most donors. 
 Starter Pack provided  ‘enough free seed and fertiliser along with extension advice for all 
smallholders to cultivate 0.1ha of staple grains… and legumes’ (Harrigan, 2003: 856); but the World 
Bank did not support the programme, neither did any other donor subscribe to it except, briefly, 
DFID11, and the programme had to be drastically scaled down from the millennium onwards.  From 
this year onwards,when a high-water mark of nearly 2 tons/hectare maize yields was reached, hybrid 
seed planting was abandoned, smallholder yields fell  progressively and had halved by 2003. Much of 
the recent increase in poverty in Malawi (table 5) is to be explained in these terms. Malawian 
smallholders, after 1994, had no structure of state support with which they could form a trusting 
partnership, and being unable to exercise voice or loyalty, responded largely by means of exit – where 
that was possible, migration to modern sector employment, and in the many cases where it was not, 
retreat into the subsistence economy. Secondly, it needs to be stressed that what failed was not just the 
capacity to provide fiscal support to available technical fixes for the smallholder sector. What also 
failed was the lack of a long-term preventive vision. Many parts of smallholder Malawi, notably the 
south, are extremely vulnerable to drought: this had been repeatedly exposed every few years, with 
particular force in the famine year of 1949 (Vaughan, 1987) and again in 1992. Yet investment to 
reduce the vulnerability of the south to drought, through soil conservation work, minor irrigation and 
climatic insurance schemes, never took place, with the consequence than when the drought of 2002 hit, 
the fall in output was the same as ten years previously. The contrast with Ethiopia, which had also 
experienced famine and learnt from it, was eloquent.   
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where such a large component of public expenditure as that financed by aid 
cannot be depended upon. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5. Policy conclusions and recommendations 
 
In the wake of the shift from generalised ‘adjustment lending’ to a  framework 
of programme aid centred around long-term poverty reduction operations, 
critiques of conditionality have gathered impetus. Proposals for reform range 
from abandonment of conditionality in favour of outright selectivity (Collier 
1999, Collier and Dollar 2002), to reduction of the number of conditions within 
a long-term framework and their unbundling into ‘policy clusters’  such as 
macro, budget and equity (Leandro et al.  1999) to joint determination of 
performance criteria on the Ugandan model (Adam and Gunning 2002). 
 The approach taken here rejects the first of these proposals, and 
argues that the second and third are already on the way to being realised 
through the new conditionalities that the World Bank and the bilaterals, at any 
rate, are currently practising. More radically, it argues that what is important 
for the effectiveness of budget support aid is not only aid volume and 
targeting, but also stability; and that for all of these objectives and especially 
the last trust is the crucial variable; more crucial, on the evidence we present, 
than compliance with publicly stated conditions. Where trust is effectively built 
up, much of the conflictual basis of conventional conditionality disappears, 
and with it many of its efficiency costs. 
 This idea forces us to examine the determinants of donor-recipient trust 
and possible mechanisms for cultivating it, which we do within a social capital 
framework. We argue that trust has in practice been achieved not only 
through a positive ‘social history’ but by the transmission of forward-looking 
‘signals’ or ‘bona fides’ concerning fundamentals, which we infer, on the 
strength of our statistical analysis, to be high pro-poor expenditure, low 
military expenditure, and low corruption. If these are present, trust builds and 
budget support aid is stable, and slippage on overt conditionality is forgiven – 
as a rule. But there are outliers to this trend, as our case-study analysis 
demonstrates: some countries have sent pro-poor signals but been rebuffed 
by donors, resulting in stop-go. More positively, initiative-taking and charisma 
in defence of pro-poor options have often been effective in keeping aid stable 
in despite of massive non-compliance; so also have been procedural reforms 
such as the spread of IMF resident missions12. Where aid is stable, growth 
and poverty reduction performance are enhanced.  
                 The implication is that there is still an aid multiplier to be derived 
from the conversion of guns into butter and other pro-poor expenditure 
reforms, and that contrary to Collier’s  proposals (1999, 2002),conditionality 
has been instrumental in achieving this process, as our case studies show 
(see also Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor(2004)). This however has not been 
                                                 
12 This suggestion has been made by the IMF internal evaluation of the ESAF (IMF 1998),page 22. 
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orthodox conditionality but a kind of shadow conditionality, focussed on 
targets other than those formally announced as performance criteria and 
requiring recipients to be able to read between the lines. Those that have 
been able to master this art have earned impressive rewards, and a further 
growth and poverty dividend could be achieved by getting the true 
performance criteria which effectively earn trust better into line with the formal 
ones. 
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Appendix. Aid and adjustment data, 1985-2005 
 
(1)Numbers following loan name are estimated disbursements in $ million; 
names of credits apply to operations which began in year stated. For IMF 
operations disbursement is interpreted as the year –on-year change in the 
‘undrawn balance’ of the loan; for World Bank operations disbursements must 
in general be inferred from Project Performance Audit Reports. 
(2) For the World Bank, all structural, sector adjustment and multisector loans 
are included. After approximately 1999  Bank terminology changes and the 
expression ‘adjustment lending’ disappears from Bank vocabulary and the 
disbursements recorded here relate to concessional credits with policy 
conditions attached in the fields of: (poverty reduction and) economic 
management; public sector governance; and the ‘pro-poor’ sectors (primary 
health, primary education, agriculture and social protection) 
(3) Figures relate to calendar years but are estimated from IMF and World 
Bank financial  years ending on 30 April of year stated. 
(4) Sources for programme compliance: (a)Mosley, Harrigan and Toye 1995, 
table 5.6 page  ; (b)Mosley 1996, appendix table 1 pp. 430-440; (c)Mecagni 
1999, appendix   ;(c) Mecagni 1999, table 9.16; (d) World Bank CPIA index, 
as recorded by Collier  (2000), page    
(5)Programme interruptions are shaded. 
 
 
 1985 86 87 88 89 90 91 
Ghana        
IMF(ESAF)    SAF 
45 
Esaf 1 
31 
Esaf 2 
53 
Esaf 3 
28 
Other IMF Stan
dby 
60 
 
 Standb
y 
32 
EFF 
50 
   
World Bank  26 11  Second 
SAC 
60 
 
 
45.7 
Private Invt. Proj.
60 
 
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
60 26 43 95 91 98 88 
Programme 
compliance 
70(a)    75(a)   
Kenya        
IMF(ESAF)    SAF 
29 
Esaf 1 
28 
Esaf 2 
43 
Esaf 2 then 3 
72 
Other IMF     Standby 
63 
  
World Bank Stan
dby 
30 
45 35 68 
(incl.16 
standby
) 
Ind. Sec. 
Adj. C. 
67 
39 Fin. Sec. Adj. C. 
69 
 33
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
30 45 35 97 158 82 141 
Programme 
compliance 
a)60    a)22   
Malawi        
IMF(ESAF)    Esaf 1 Esaf 1 
and 2 
8 
  
Other IMF EFF 
28 
EFF 
28 
 Standb
y 10 
Standby 
10 
 
Esaf 2 
and 3 
19 
Esaf 3 
7 
World Bank  27 35 40 Industrial 
and 
Trade 
Adjustme
nt Credit 
54 
20 Agric. Sector 
Adj. Programme 
64 
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
28 55 35 50 74 39 71 
Programme 
compliance 
55(a)     30(a)   
Mozambique        
IMF(ESAF)   SAF1 
10 
SAF1/2 
20 
SAF2/3 
XX 
No 
drawings 
SAF 3 
12 
 
Other IMF        
World Bank    Second 
Rehabil
itation 
Credit 
40 
 
 
 
20 
Industrial 
Sector 
Adjustme
nt Credit 
40 
 
 
 
35 
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
  10 60 20 52 35 
Programme 
compliance 
       
Tanzania        
IMF(ESAF)    SAF 
21 
SAF 
32 
SAF 
21 
 
Other IMF        
World Bank  40 Multisec
tor 
Rehabili
tation 
Credit 
25 
10 60 30 Ag. Sector 
Adj. 
Programme 
120 
 34
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
 40 25 31 92 51 120 
Programme 
compliance 
       
 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
Zimbabwe        
IMF(ESAF)        
Other IMF        
World Bank        
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Programme 
compliance 
       
Zambia        
IMF(ESAF)        
Other IMF  Stan
dby 
35 
Standby
35 
    
World Bank   
35 
 Industri
al 
Sector 
Adjust
ment 
Credit 
35 
14 17 Economic  
Recovery  
Programme 
99 
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
 70 35 35 14 17 99 
Programme 
compliance 
       
Ethiopia        
IMF(ESAF)        
Other IMF        
World Bank        
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Programme 
compliance 
       
Uganda        
IMF(ESAF)        
Other IMF    SAF 
23 
ESAF 
10 
ESAF 
54 
ESAF 
37 
 35
World Bank    Econo
mic 
Recove
ry 
Progra
mme 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
Economic  
Recovery Credit 
 
 
 
 
138 
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
0 0 0 43 33 79 175 
Programme 
compliance 
       
Sierra Leone        
IMF(ESAF) SAF1 
6 
SAF1 
6 
X 9/87 
11 
   4/94 
Other IMF        
World Bank  5      
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
0 11 11 0 0 0 0 
Programme 
compliance 
       
 
 
 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
Lesotho        
IMF(ESAF)        
Other IMF     SAF 
3 
SAF 
7 
 
World Bank       10 
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
    3 7 10 
Programme 
compliance 
       
Nigeria        
IMF(ESAF)        
Other IMF   Standby 
XJan-
Dec87 
 Standby 
X Jan-Dec 
89 
 Standby
XJan-
Dec 91 
World Bank        
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Programme 
compliance 
       
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
       
IMF(ESAF)        
 36
Other IMF  Standby:
53 
Standby:
24 
Standby:
7 
 Standby:
31 
 
World Bank        
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
 53 24 7 0 31  
Programme 
compliance 
       
Senegal        
IMF(ESAF)  SAF1 
17 
SAF1/2 
43 
SAF2 
12 
ESAF1 
11 
ESAF2 
62 
ESAF3 
38 
Other IMF        
World Bank Standby 
22 
Standby 
44 
22 Standby 
13 
 
Supplement 
to SAC3 
SAC4 
44 
 
47 
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
22 61 65 25 11 106 85 
Programme 
compliance 
       
 
 
 1992 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Ghana        
IMF(ESAF)     Esaf:30 Esaf:27 Esaf:1 
Other IMF        
World Bank Second 
Fin. Sec. 
Adj. 
 
110 
Private 
Enterprise 
and 
Export 
Devt. 
71 
Ag. Sec 
Investment 
Proj. 
 
 
46 
    
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
110 71 46  30 27 1 
Programme 
compliance 
  64(b)     
Kenya        
IMF(ESAF) Esaf 3 
75 
X 3/93 to 
12/93 
Esaf 4  Esaf 5: 
X1/96-
12/96 
Esaf 5: 
25 
Esaf5: 
X1/98-
12/98 
Other IMF      SDA:20 SDA:16
World Bank Ed. Sec. 
Adj. P.80 
26 97     
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
115 26 97 0 0 45 16 
Programme 
compliance 
  42(b)    30(c) 
 37
Malawi        
IMF(ESAF)        
Other IMF Esaf 4 
35 
Esaf 4 
25 
 
10 
 Esaf 5:7 Esaf 
5:13 
Esaf 
5:4 
World Bank 35 0 0  286 18  
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
70 25 10  286 31 4 
Programme 
compliance 
  56(b)     
Mozambique        
IMF(ESAF) Esaf2 
40 
Esaf3 
85 
X1/94 to 
6/94, then 
Esaf 4 
15 
 
Esaf 
4 
   
Other IMF        
World Bank Economic 
Recovery 
Programme 
80 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
10 
Second 
Economic 
Recovery 
Programme 
90 
 
 
 
 
50+ 
 
 
 
 
60+ 
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
120 135 55 10 90 50 60 
Programme 
compliance 
65(c)  75(b)     
Tanzania        
IMF(ESAF) Esaf 1 and 
2 
20 
Esaf 2 
85 
ESAF 2 
11 
 
  Esaf3: 
26 
Esaf3: 
14 
Other IMF      SDA:27  
World Bank Financial 
sector Adj. 
Programme 
170 
120 61 0    
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
190 205 72 0  53 14 
Programme 
compliance 
  38(b)     
 
 
 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Zimbabwe        
IMF(ESAF) Esaf 1:70 Esaf1:34 Esaf2:48 X3/95     12/96   
Other IMF  EFF:31    GRA:
15 
GRA: 18
 38
World Bank SAC1 
40 
SAC2 
55 
 
15 
 
40 
 
   
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
110 120 63 40  15 18 
Programme 
compliance 
50%  14%     
Zambia        
IMF(ESAF)    Esaf:280 Esaf:150 Esaf:
230 
X1/98 to 
12/98 
Other IMF Standby 
80 
      
World Bank Privatisation 
and Industrial 
Reform Credit 
210 
65 95 50 338 245  
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
290 65 95 330 488 475  
Programme 
compliance 
  42     
Ethiopia        
IMF(ESAF)  SAF 
14 
SAF 
21 
  ESAF
1:15 
X1/98 to 
12/98 
Other IMF        
World Bank Emergency 
reconstruction 
95 
Struct. 
Adjustment 
credit 
105 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
120 
105 60 65 
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
95 119 121 120 105 60 65 
Programme 
compliance 
  70     
Uganda        
IMF(ESAF) 95 20   ESAF 
1:21 
ESAF
1: 
43 
ESAF 
2:initi
ated 
ESAF2: 
40 
Other IMF        
World Bank Structural 
Adjustment 
Credit 
100 
Financial 
Sector 
adjustment 
131 
Second 
SAC 
130 
70 42 140  
 39
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
195 151 102 70 42 140  
Programme 
compliance 
  76     
Sierra 
Leone 
       
IMF(ESAF) X9/87  4/94, 
then 
ESAF1 
63 
X3/95-
12/95 
ESAF2 
82 
  
Other IMF        
World Bank Reconstructio
n Import 
Credit: 43 
 Structura
l 
Adjustm
ent 
Credit 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
  
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
43 0 38 30 40   
Programme 
compliance 
  16     
 
 
 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Lesotho        
IMF(ESAF) 5 5 8     
Other IMF    GRA:3  SDA:5 SDA:3 
World Bank   Private 
sector 
devt. 
11 
    
Total IMF 
and World 
Bank 
5 5 19 3 0 5 3 
Programme 
compliance 
       
Nigeria        
IMF(ESAF)        
Other IMF        
World Bank 30 20 38 6 0 10 6 
Other 
multilateral 
and 
bilateral 
30 20 38 6 0 10 6 
Programme 
compliance 
  29     
 40
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
       
IMF(ESAF)   ESAF:60 ESAF:59 ESAF:119 ESAF:22 New 
ESAF:83
Other IMF Standby: 
33 
      
World Bank Financial 
Sector 
Adjustment 
65 
40 62 70 24   
Total World 
Bank and 
IMF 
98 40 122 129 143 22 83 
Programme 
compliance 
  34     
Senegal        
IMF(ESAF) SAF3 
X6/92 
  
6/94 
20 
ESAF1 
30 
 
ESAF2 
21 
 
  
Other IMF        
World Bank 5 0 Economic 
Recovery 
Credit 
40 
20+    
Total World 
Bank and 
IMF 
5 0 60 50 21 0 0 
Programme 
compliance 
  na     
 
 
 99 2000 01 02 03 04 
Ghana       
IMF(ESAF/PRGF) Esaf:22 Esaf:23 PRGF 1: 
70 
  PRGF 
2:53  
Other IMF       
World Bank 137 66 109 165 290  
Total World Bank 
and IMF 
159 89 179 165 290 53 
Programme 
compliance 
Good(CPIA)    3.49(CPIA)  
Kenya       
IMF(ESAF/PRGF)   PRGF1:34 X1/02-
12/02 
PRGF2:36  
Other IMF       
World Bank   85 45 50  
Total World Bank 
and IMF 
0 0 85 45 50  
 41
Programme 
compliance 
Poor(CPIA)    2.71(CPIA)  
Malawi       
IMF(ESAF/PRGF) ESAF:7   X1/02 12/03 ESAF 
:13 
Other IMF HIPC:3      
World Bank 83 42 83 33 23  
Total World Bank 
and IMF 
93 42 83 33 23 13 
Programme 
compliance 
Mod(CPIA)    3.29(CPIA)  
Mozambique       
IMF(ESAF/PRGF)       
Other IMF       
World Bank 21 36 20 14 145  
Total World Bank 
and IMF 
      
Programme 
compliance 
Mod(CPIA)    3.32(CPIA)  
Tanzania       
IMF(ESAF/PRGF) ESAF 4:20 PRGF1:30 PRGF1:30 PRGF1:40 PRGF 
1:20 
PRGF2:
6 
 
Other IMF   HIPC:13 HIPC:69   
Total World Bank 
and IMF 
40 60 51 40 20  
Other multilateral 
and bilateral 
60 90 81 149 40 6 
Programme 
compliance 
Mod(CPIA)    2.98(CPIA)  
 
 
 99 2000 01 02 03 04 
Zimbabwe       
IMF(ESAF)       
Other IMF  5     
World Bank       
Other multilateral 
and bilateral 
0 5 0 0 0 0 
Programme 
compliance 
Mod(CPIA)    3.67(CPIA)  
Zambia       
IMF(ESAF/PRGF) ESAF:10 X1/00-
12/00 
PRGF:45 PRGF:50   
Other IMF   HIPC:117 HIPC:16 HIPC:234 SDA:37 
World Bank 92 201 90 76 10  
Total World Bank 
and IMF 
102 201 247 142 244 37 
 42
Programme 
compliance 
Mod(CPIA)    3.46(CPIA)  
Ethiopia       
IMF(ESAF/PRGF) ESAF:15  PRGF:17 
 
PRGF: 52 PRGF:16  
Other IMF   SDA:26 SDA:17 
HIPC:4 
SDA:8 
HIPC:4 
HIPC:18
SDA:3 
World Bank 20 40 164 Structural 
Adjustment 
Credit:110 
80  
Total World Bank 
and IMF 
35 40 93 103 108 101 
Programme 
compliance 
Good(CPIA)      
Uganda       
IMF(ESAF/PRGF) ESAF 2:17 ESAF2: 
26 
  PRGF:125  
Other IMF   HIPC: 61 HIPC: 
2 
  
World Bank 31 84 95 132 205 70 
Total World Bank 
and IMF 
48 110 156 134 205 70 
Programme 
compliance 
Very 
Good(CPIA)
   4.14(CPIA)  
Sierra Leone       
IMF(ESAF/PRGF)       
Other IMF       
World Bank  30 30 50 30 30 
Total World Bank 
and IMF 
0 30 30 50 30 30 
Programme 
compliance 
na    2.54(CPIA)  
 
 
 99 2000 01 02 03 04 
Lesotho       
IMF(ESAF/PRGF)   PRGF1:3 PRGF2:7  PRGF2:21
Other IMF       
World Bank  30 30 50 30  
Total World Bank 
and IMF 
0 30 33 57 30 21 
Programme 
compliance 
Good(CPIA)
(d) 
   3.76(CPIA)  
Nigeria       
IMF(ESAF)       
Other IMF       
World Bank  25 115 50 135 70 
Other multilateral 
and bilateral 
 25 115 50 135 70 
 43
Programme 
compliance 
Poor(CPIA) 
(d) 
   2.58(CPIA)  
Cote d’Ivoire       
IMF(ESAF)  21 30 45 30  
Other IMF       
World Bank     12 2 
Total IMF and 
World Bank 
 21 30 45 42 2 
Programme 
compliance 
Good(CPIA)
(d) 
   3.43(CPIA)  
Senegal       
IMF(ESAF)       
Other IMF  28 30    
World Bank  25 35    
Total IMF and 
World Bank 
0 53 65 0 0 0 
Programme 
compliance 
Good(CPIA) 
(d) 
   3.12(CPIA)  
 
Sources: Disbursements,Appendices to IMF and World Bank Annual Reports 
(typically Appendix X for IMF and Section 6, ‘Summary Statement of 
Development Credits’ for World Bank). 
 Programme interruptions, Mecagni 1999 ; 
Programme compliance, (4) Sources for programme compliance: (a)Mosley, 
Harrigan and Toye 1995, table 5.6 page  ; (b)Mosley 1996, appendix table 1 
pp. 430-440; (c)Mecagni 1999, appendix   ;(c) Mecagni 1999, table 9.16; (d) 
World Bank CPIA index, as recorded by Collier  (2000), page   . 
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